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
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GENERAL

1	Bidault believes fear of Communist China will influence Soviet position at Geneva:				
25X1A	French foreign minister Bidault on 25 March outlined to Ambassador Dillon his 'general impression' of probable Soviet positions at Geneva. Bidault said his views were based on a 24 March interview with Soviet ambassador Vinogradov. The Soviet ambassador made no attempt to connect the Geneva conference with EDC.				
	Bidault believes the Soviet leaders are ''deeply afraid'' that Communist China will ''drag them into an adventure'' and are, therefore, ''really desirous of achieving peace, or at least a cease-fire, in Indochina.'' For these reasons, the Soviet delegation at Geneva will be 'hoping for United States assistance in controlling Communist China.''				
_	Comment:				
25X1	Moscow				
20,(1)	and Peiping appear to be in substantial agreement on the Far Eastern Communist program and on their respective roles in it. Since mid-1951, this program has not called for aggressive military ventures of the Korean type.				
	The USSR and China seem confident that the Communists are in a position to demand a high price for ending the Indochina war and that continued military pressure will eventually force the French to take the initiative in making a truce offer to the Viet Minh.				
	25X1A				

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training and save the regular battalions for a more important mission, probably an attempt to isolate Hanoi in conjunction with a major attack on Dien Bien Phu.

Comment: This report indicates that the enemy now has about 20,000 regulars inside the delta perimeter, as compared to the approximately 13,000 recently reported. The enemy also has some 55,000 auxiliary troops inside the perimeter.

The Viet Minh attacks on Tonkin airfields shortly before the assault on Dien Bien Phu provide evidence that the enemy's activity in the delta is closely coordinated with its plans for Dien Bien Phu.

SOUTH ASIA

4. Turkish-Pakistani defense agreement ready for signature:

25X	1	A	

Turkey's Foreign Ministry has agreed to all textual changes suggested by Pakistan in the defense pact between the two countries, and hopes that the Pakistani foreign minister

will come to Ankara to sign the agreement within a few days. If this is not possible, the Turks propose to authorize their ambassador in Karachi to sign, since they believe immediate action is essential.

Comment: Turkey's readiness to sign the agreement at once suggests that Ankara has not been frightened off by the Karachi government's defeat in the recent East Pakistan elections. Immediate signature would obviate delays that might ensue should Pakistan become temporarily preoccupied by domestic political problems posed by these elections.

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25X1			
7.	Ambassador Caffery's	analysis of situation in	Cairo:
25X1A	return to political acti	to avoid grave unrest that the Nasr-domina Council yielded to Na	suggests that it was only t and possible civil war ted Revolutionary Comman- gib's desire for an early
	which a settlement on	The RCC hopes that i ties and elections will c Suez is possible. The l red and even enhanced b	reate an atmosphere in RCC also feels that its
		rst elements in the cour	ted his willingness "to ntry, including the Wafd- unists," in order to stay
	sive struggle for power elements have an oppo	ts that Nagib retains the continues, and it seen rtunity to enter the pict and impair the chances	ns that extremist ure. Such a development of success for a Suez
•	WESTERN EUROPE		
8.	Paris embassy believe Dien Bien Phu:	s Laniel government co	uld survive fall of
25X1A		result in the fall of th	of Dien Bien Phu would
	25X1	A - 7 -	27 Mar 54

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The embassy supports its view by citing such factors as the imminence of the Geneva talks and the wish of National Assembly deputies to avoid the risk of dissolution and new elections at this time. Furthermore, it doubts that an assembly majority could be found in favor of immediate negotiations with the Viet Minh. A defeat at Dien Bien Phu would, however, severely shock French public opinion.

Premier Laniel is reported to be Comment: increasingly optimistic about the whole Indochina situation. He told Ambassador Dillon on 23 March that defeatism in France has now considerably abated.

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